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PRODUCT VARIETY AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
Research summary: In vertical relationships the potential for scale economy in manufacturing 
often calls for specialization and outsourcing. Specialization, however, depends critically on the 
stability of the task and contractual environment. In a highly uncertain environment the need for 
frequent mutual adjustments favors integration instead of outsourcing. To evaluate vertical 
relationships in value chains where one stage competes on product variety under great 
uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale, we compare operations data at about 300 
distribution centers within a major soft-drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an 
upstream firm. We find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm by 
aligning incentives and reducing strategic information asymmetry, but it worsened coordination 
for upstream rivals who shared the same downstream facilities.  
Managerial summary: Managers make frequent decisions about outsourcing vs. integration. 
This paper helps to crystalize the costs and benefits of integration by pointing to two important 
factors: the potential for economies of scale and the need for coordination under uncertainty. It 
studies an industry where one stage of the value chain competes on product variety under great 
uncertainty and the other stage competes on scale. Based on operations data at about 300 
distribution centers within a major soft-drink bottler before and after it was integrated into an 
upstream firm, we find that vertical integration improved coordination for the integrated firm (by 
reducing both stockouts and inventory, and improving sales forecasts), but it worsened 
coordination for upstream rivals who shared the same downstream facilities.  
 Key words: vertical integration; coordination; product variety; information asymmetry; 
stockout. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Repeated exchange relationships between two neighboring stages of the value chain are 
vulnerable to coordination problems when an upstream firm competes on product variety, with 
the products manufactured and distributed by a downstream firm that competes on scale. From 
the upstream firm’s perspective, vertical integration helps to coordinate product sequencing and 
successive innovations that require frequent mutual adaptation along the value chain (Helfat & 
Campo-Rembado, 2016; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000), thereby accommodating product variety 
and differentiation (Argyres & Bigelow, 2010). From the downstream firm’s perspective, 
contracting accommodates gains to specialization by allowing the downstream firm to pool 
contacts from different customers to achieve greater economies of scale and learning (Jacobides 
& Hitt, 2005). Uncertainty will aggravate these incentive conflicts between the upstream and 
downstream firms and make contracting costly (Klein, 2000; Teece, 1996; Williamson, 1975). 
Should the two stages vertically integrate to pursue product differentiation despite the higher 
production cost, or should they continue to contract based on scale and give up product variety? 
In this paper, we investigate the mechanisms by which contracting solution gives way to vertical 
integration when demand uncertainty with respect to product variety increases, and how 
upstream competitors will be affected if one of them vertically integrates the downstream facility.  
We focus on the impact of vertical integration on the coordination challenges along the value 
chain. We argue that the very demand for economies of scale may require the downstream firm 
to produce for multiple upstream firms, exacerbating vertical coordination challenges and 
jeopardizing the upstream firm’s product variety strategy. In particular, sharing downstream 
capacity among multiple upstream firms creates problems of strategic information asymmetry. 
On the one hand, a downstream firm seeking to maximize its profits may under-forecast sales for 
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one upstream firm so that it produces less for this firm but more for another (Yehezkel, 2008). 
On the other hand, an upstream firm may not fully share strategic information down the value 
chain (Novak & Eppinger, 2001). For instance, while providing incomplete or untimely 
information makes the downstream firm’s sales forecasts noisy, the upstream firm may keep 
promotion or new product launch plan in secrecy until shortly before the actual event because it 
fears the information could be leaked to competing upstream firms that share the same 
downstream facility. If one of the upstream firms integrates the downstream firm, the 
coordination between these two firms can be enhanced by aligning incentives and sharing 
information, albeit at a cost to the other upstream firms that still share the downstream facility. 
To test these ideas, we take a quantitative case study approach using detailed unit–product- 
level operations data to offer a granular view of the tradeoffs firms face along the value chain 
and shed light on the relationship between a firm’s product variety and its vertical scope. The 
context of our empirical study is the soft drink industry, where the two dominant concentrate 
producers (CPs), Coca-Cola and Pepsi, compete fiercely on product variety and on-time store 
delivery. For decades the CPs have been taking advantage of their market power and securing 
supply through exclusive contracts with the bottlers, who rely on the large business volume to 
achieve economies of scale. In order to extract value from maximum scale, the large CPs also 
share bottling facilities with other smaller CPs. This sharing arrangement maximizes scale but 
creates obstacles along other dimensions, such as making it more difficult to introduce and 
coordinate new products. These difficulties became more pronounced over the last decade as the 
CPs faced increasing pressure to diversify their product categories from traditional carbonated 
soft drinks (CSDs) to healthier, non-carbonated soft drinks (NonCSDs). However, bottlers have 
strongly opposed this change, as their existing capital-intensive production process relies heavily 
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on economies of scale from CSD products (Financial Times, 2009a). To overcome the burden of 
increased coordination, both Coca-Cola and Pepsi restructured their largest bottlers from 
minority shareholdings to fully-owned subsidiaries—a change that makes it possible for us to 
compare multiple operations variables before and after the full integration. 
Our analyses are based on operations data at the product (stock-keeping unit, or SKU) level 
across hundreds of distribution centers (DCs) within a major bottling company (the Bottler) for 
one dominant CP between 2008 and 2011, during which time the Bottler was fully acquired by 
the CP. Our focus is a key measure of coordination performance along the value chain: stockouts. 
Stockouts happen when customer orders are not completely fulfilled. Frequent stockouts result in 
customer dissatisfaction and ultimately hurt sales, profitability, and future demand (Anderson, 
Fitzsimons, & Simester, 2006a; Musalem et al., 2010; Wan, Evers, & Dresner, 2012). It is 
therefore an important performance measure in the product variety literature.  
We first examined about 1200 SKUs that were produced and distributed by the Bottler for 
the parent CP both before and after full integration. We found that despite the Bottler’s 
significantly increased product offerings in the NonCSD category after integration, the stockout 
rate for an average DC–SKU pair in our sample dropped by 2% (from a pre-integration sample 
average of 26%), and that the reduction was significantly more for NonCSDs than for CSDs. 
We then explored the mechanisms of incentives and information that could influence 
stockouts. An upstream firm has incentive to develop new products and promote brands; it needs 
the downstream firm to produce and deliver its products promptly to minimize stockouts, 
especially in its newly entered and strategic segments. In contrast, a downstream firm wants to 
lower its production and distribution costs, mainly through producing and delivering a single 
category of products with large volumes and avoiding products with relatively low and uncertain 
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demand, as well as through minimizing excess inventory. Because NonCSDs have smaller and 
less certain demand, and producing them requires bottlers to frequently adjust their process away 
from producing CSDs, bottlers have less incentive to carry NonCSDs, notwithstanding the 
greater strategic value of NonCSDs for the CPs. A full integration reduces incentive conflicts, we 
therefore expected our analysis to show DCs carrying higher inventories after integration, 
particularly among NonCSDs. However, to our surprise, we found that the inventory of 
NonCSDs decreased (relative to both actual and forecasted sales) after integration. The reduction 
in both stockouts and inventory suggests that integration created an overall improvement in 
coordination efficiency. 
We next examined if the improved efficiency was consistent with an improvement in 
information sharing along the value chain. We compared DCs’ sales forecasts before and after 
integration. We found that DCs adjusted their sales forecast upwards, especially if they were 
located close to the CP, where integration could enable closer monitoring by the CP. We also 
found that DCs reduced the noise (standard deviation) in their sales forecasts. This reduction was 
greater for DCs located far from the CP, where they could not easily observe the CP’s plan for 
product launches and promotions, and would therefore benefit more from explicit notification 
from the CP after integration. We also found that DCs reduced forecast noise more for newer 
products, whose demand is more susceptible to disturbance caused by promotion and other 
product launches.  
As a comparison, we examined about 300 SKUs (mostly CSDs) produced and distributed by 
the Bottler for its CP parent’s competitors under license agreements. We find that for these 
products, stockout rates increased after integration, while both inventory and sales forecasts 
reduced. In addition, the noise in sales forecasts increased. This is consistent with a worsened 
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incentive and information problem between the upstream competitors of the CP parent and the 
CP parent’s now fully integrated Bottler. 
Overall, our results suggest that, on the one hand, vertical integration plays a positive role in 
coordinating between an upstream and a downstream firm by aligning incentives and facilitating 
monitoring and information sharing along the value chain. On the other hand, vertical integration 
introduces a competitive disadvantage for the CP parents’ competitors that share the same 
downstream facilities through contracts. 
Our theoretical analyses and empirical findings have relevance for several strands of 
literature. First, they complement recent studies on the relationship between firms’ horizontal 
and vertical scopes. On the one hand, they confirm the coordination benefits of vertical 
integration for enhancing firms’ adaptability across markets (Forbes & Lederman, 2009; Novak 
& Stern, 2009), and the benefit of integrative capability for seizing strategic opportunities in 
industries dominated by successive innovations (Helfat & Campo-Rembado, 2016; Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2000). On the other hand, the finding that integration worsens coordination with 
rival upstream firms is consistent with the hypothesis that firms’ horizontal and vertical scopes 
can also be substitutive due to constraints in a firm’s total coordination capacity (Zhou, 2011).  
Secondly, for the literature on product variety, our focus on coordination problems echoes 
prior research on the operational risk of product variety despite its strategic value (Barnett & 
Freeman, 2001; Cottrell & Nault, 2004; Sorenson, 2000). While the operations issues that arise 
with product variety in stockouts, inventory, and forecast error have been studied in the 
operations management literature (Fisher, 1997; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Wan & Dresner, 2015), 
studies about product variety and organizational interactions along the supply chain are rare 
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(Ramdas, 2003). By focusing on vertical integration, this paper introduces organizational factors 
to the analyses.  
Finally, our analyses add to a rich body of case studies on vertical integration in general and 
the soft drink industry in particular (Karnani, 2010; Klein, 2000; Muris, Scheffman, & Spiller, 
1992; Yoffie & Kim, 2012). While the majority of prior cases examine transaction costs arising 
from relationship-specific investments, the current paper focuses on a narrow time window 
around vertical integration, during which no significant physical investments were made. This 
allowed us a unique vantage from which to analyze adaptation-related coordination issues. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Product Variety and Vertical Coordination 
By catering to a wider range of customer preferences, product variety increases the aggregated 
demand for a firm’s products but often reduces the demand and increases the sales volatility for 
individual variety (e.g., Anupindi et al., 2011; Cachon & Terwiesch, 2012), which exacerbates 
coordination problems along the value chain. First, it increases incentive conflicts between the 
upstream and downstream firms. For the downstream firms, product variety increases production 
costs by compromising economies of scale, increases equipment and overhead costs, and lowers 
worker productivity. It also increases distribution costs as the downstream firm has to deliver 
each variety in smaller batches and keep extra inventory (wasting working capital) to account for 
unexpected variation in consumer demand across varieties.  
In addition, product variety exacerbates information asymmetry between the upstream and 
downstream firm. The information asymmetry can be in both directions. On the one hand, a 
downstream firm has better information about consumers’ willingness to pay for various 
varieties and may not accurately share that information with the upstream firm. In our context, 
the Bottler collects most of the demand information directly from the stores when its truck 
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drivers make deliveries or when its sales representatives conduct routine inspections of store 
shelves. The downstream firm may under-forecast demand so that (1) the upstream firm extracts 
less value (e.g., in the form of franchise or license fees); (2) the downstream firm produces less 
of the variety that does not maximize its profit; or (3) the downstream firm has more freedom to 
manufacture other varieties (Yehezkel, 2008), including varieties for other upstream firms. 
Sharing markets, facilities, and production processes across multiple product varieties makes it 
difficult for the upstream firm to separate the demand, costs, and performance of individual 
varieties for evaluation, compensation, and, therefore, contracting.  
On the other hand, an upstream firm might hesitate to share proprietary information down the 
value chain, especially if the downstream firm also manufactures for other upstream firms. The 
upstream firm’s proprietary knowledge about technological innovation and product design, as 
well as its plans for promotions and new product launches, can be more readily leaked to 
competitors with whom they share production or distribution facilities. Strategic information 
withholding by upstream firms due to concern over leakage in the supply chain is prevalent in 
many contexts with differentiated products (Anand & Goyal, 2009). These concerns may cause 
the upstream firm to restrict its downstream firm’s access to strategic information, even when 
those restrictions hinder coordination (Novak & Stern, 2009). In private conversations with us, 
the Bottler’s forecasting staff often complained about how, before integration, the CP waited 
until the last minute to give them accurate information about promotion and launch plans, 
leaving the Bottler too little time to refine its sales forecasts and plan production. When the CP 
launches a new variety without giving the Bottler sufficient lead time, the Bottler will not be able 
to adequately account for the substitution effect between the demand for the new variety and the 
demand for the existing varieties; it will therefore over-forecast the demand for the existing 
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varieties. On the other hand, when the CP announces a price promotion for an existing variety 
too late, the Bottler will under-forecast the demand for the existing variety. Therefore, secrecy on 
the part of the CP about either new variety launch or old variety promotion against the Bottler 
leads to forecast noise. 
In sum, expanding in a new product category increases sales volatility, as well as production 
and distribution costs. If the strategic value of product variety outweighs these additional costs, 
then the jointly optimal decision along the value chain should be to increase variety. However, 
contracting between the upstream and downstream firms to achieve a jointly optimal outcome is 
not easy. Increasing product variety increases the number of contingencies that need to be 
covered, monitored, and enforced under a contract. In addition, to the extent that different 
product varieties are interdependent in their needs for resources and adjustments, the contract 
may get overly complex or even infeasible. Because of these contracting problems we expect the 
Bottler to have a higher stockout rate for NonCSDs than for CSDs before integration. 
Vertical Integration and Coordination 
Vertical integration can improve coordination in several ways. First, it aligns incentives by 
providing both transacting parties ownership over residual claims (Williamson, 1985; Hart and 
Moore, 2005). It subjects organizational units to more compatible profit objectives that facilitate 
an integrated response to changes in global circumstances (Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), such as rapidly evolving technology and consumer demand (Weigelt 
& Sarkar, 2012). Second, vertical integration enables closer monitoring of employee effort (Hart, 
1995; Williamson, 1975). Similar to arguments made by Joskow (2008), employees within a 
subsidiary have more incentive (e.g., avoiding termination for false reporting) and obligation to 
reveal information to the parent company than employees within a less closely affiliated 
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contractor; the parent company also has more authority and means (e.g., internal auditing) to 
collect information from its own subsidiary than from a less closely affiliated contractor. Finally, 
vertical integration facilitates information sharing by weakening the incentives for knowledge 
appropriation and better protecting trade secrecy (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Novak & Stern, 
2009). 
In our context, after integration the Bottler has greater incentive to carry more NonCSDs, 
therefore it will be more likely to increase inventory. The Bottler will also have more incentive 
and obligation to share information with the CP, and the CP will have more authority to visit the 
stores to assess demand and evaluate sales forecasts directly.  Finally, the Bottler will have 
greater incentive and obligation to protect the CP’s proprietary information, so that the CP will 
share its promotion and product launch plans with the Bottler in a timelier manner, thereby 
enabling the Bottler to make more accurate adjustments to its forecasts and production schedule. 
We therefore expect the Bottler to have a lower stockout rate for the products of its CP parent 
after integration, particularly among NonCSDs.  
Vertical Integration and Competition 
Vertical integration offers competitive advantages in oligopolistic industries. Mainly, the 
integrated firm can foreclose either sources of supply or channels of distribution to prevent their 
non-integrated rivals from accessing these sources or channels (Chipty, 2001; Hart et al., 1990). 
In the soft drink industry the upstream segment is occupied by a small number of CPs, while the 
downstream segment is populated by a large number of bottling plants and distribution centers 
owned by a few dozen “bottlers.” This gives the large upstream CPs more bargaining power over 
the bottlers. The large CPs’ bargaining power is further enhanced by the bottler’s need for large 
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contracts to achieve economies of scale to improve their thin profit margin. Under such 
conditions, the large upstream firms can use exclusive contracts to secure supply. 
However, even with business from the major upstream firms, some downstream firms may 
not have enough volume to maximize economies of scale. This makes it advantageous for them 
to contract with smaller upstream firms that need to source downstream production plants and 
distribution networks but lack the volume to justify an exclusive contract. In such cases, the large 
upstream firm can share its downstream facilities with smaller upstream firms, provided that the 
downstream firm does not carry rival products that are in direct competition with products of the 
large upstream firm. For example, in our context, Coca-Cola and Pepsi each allow their bottlers 
to defray the high capital costs of bottling facilities and distribution networks by carrying 
products for their smaller competitors under license agreements. In fact, bottlers for Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi each manufacture and distribute about one-third of Dr. Pepper’s products. Given that 
this sharing arrangement mainly results from concerns about economies of scale, it might create 
constraints along other dimensions (e.g., production introduction and coordination).  
We do not conceptualize our particular context as a world where firms play strategic games 
with full rationality and foresight. Rather, we view the firms as following an evolutionary 
process in adapting their product-introduction and vertical-integration decisions. The old 
arrangement in which Coca-Cola and Pepsi owned a minority share (<40%) in their downstream 
facilities and share the facilities with smaller CPs through contracts discouraged (but did not 
totally prohibit) new product introductions. As new product introduction became more important 
due to the exogenous shift in consumer demand toward healthier NonCSDs, the disadvantage of 
the contractual arrangements became more and more constraining. One way to overcome these 
disadvantages is vertical integration. 
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Therefore we examine a more subtle form of “foreclosure” that happens not through a total 
denial of the competitors’ access to production resources or distribution channels, but through a 
substitution of coordination along the value chain. More specifically, vertical integration can 
align incentives and the flow of information between an upstream firm and its downstream 
subsidiary, while at the same time magnifying incentive and information problems between the 
subsidiary and the upstream parent’s competitors that also source from the subsidiary. The 
subsidiary may now maximize its parent’s market share at a cost to the parent’s rivals. The 
subsidiary may reduce its inventory holding and demand forecasts for rival products. The rivals 
may also feel less comfortable sharing strategic information with the subsidiary, leading to 
noisier demand forecasts for their products.
1
 Even when an integrated company does not 
intentionally foreclose its rivals, the increase in internal coordination demands between the 
subsidiary and its upstream parent after integration might crowd out coordination for rival 
products. Because of this substitution in coordination, we expect the Bottler to have a greater 
stockout rate for rival’s products after integration. 
THE SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY AND THE BOTTLING COMPANY 
The soft drink industry is dominated by two CPs, Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Most bottlers in the soft 
drink industry used to be independently owned but had exclusive long-term partnerships with a 
CP. Bottlers purchase concentrate from the CP, add carbonated water and high-fructose corn 
syrup, bottle the resulting beverage, and deliver it to customers. Coca-Cola and Pepsi bottlers 
provide direct store delivery, where the bottlers’ sales or delivery staff routinely visit the stores 
                                                          
1
 Of course, foreseeing that coordination problems could lead to a loss of revenue from other upstream firms after 
integration, the downstream firm’s current shareholders may demand an acquisition premium from the acquiring 
parent. However, if the strategic value of integration is greater than the potential loss of revenue from the 
competitors, the parent and the downstream shareholders will be able to reach an agreement to split the net gain 
from integration. 
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to survey sales, check product display, stock the shelves, and place orders for replenishment 
(Cokesolutions, 2015). The bottling process is capital-intensive and relies on high-speed 
production lines; changing between products of different type or sizes is difficult. In contrast, the 
distribution process is largely influenced by “drop size” (size of each delivery). As a result, 
bottlers prefer to distribute standard products with steady and high demand. To achieve greater 
scale economy, anchor bottlers for Coca-Cola and Pepsi also produce and distribute for their CP 
partner’s rivals, provided these products do not compete directly with their CP partner’s products.  
Over the last decade, major soft drink companies have been under increasing pressure to 
expand their product lines because consumers are shifting to healthier, NonCSD drinks. For 
example, while U.S. soda consumption slid for the tenth straight year in 2014, the U.S. bottled-
water consumption jumped by 7.3% (The Wall Street Journal, 2015). According to a recent 
Gallup survey, more than 60% of Americans now avoid soda (Beverage Daily, 2015). This has 
shifted both Coca-Cola and Pepsi’s strategic focus toward NonCSDs. However, most NonCSDs 
have required smaller, specialized production processes that were challenging for bottlers’ 
existing infrastructure. Adding to the problem is the relatively small volume and uncertain 
demand for NonCSD sales, leading to higher production and distribution costs. As a result, 
bottlers are less inclined to carry NonCSDs.  
In response to the pressing need from the market to expand their product lines, and the lack 
of incentive for bottlers to cooperate with that expansion, in 2009–2010 both Coca-Cola and 
Pepsi fully integrated their largest bottlers. Before the integration, each CP had owned a 30% to 
40% shareholding stake in its anchor bottlers; the rest of the shares were publicly traded. After 
the integration, both CPs established wholly owned subsidiaries that bought out all the shares in 
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the bottlers.
2
 Both CPs claimed that the change would give them greater flexibility to adapt to 
consumer tastes, more direct control over investments in the bottling processes, and the ability to 
coordinate. According to Indra Nooyi, CEO of Pepsi, “The fully integrated beverage business 
will enable us to bring innovative products and packages to market faster, streamline our 
manufacturing and distribution systems and react more quickly to changes in the 
marketplace,  … Ultimately it will put us in a much better position to compete and to grow both 
now and in the years ahead” (Pepsi Press Release, 2009). Muhtar Kent, CEO of Coca Cola, gave 
similar comments: “Our North American business structure has remained essentially the same 
since … 1986, while the market and industry have changed dramatically. … With this 
transaction, we are converting passive capital into active capital, giving us direct control over our 
investment in North America to accelerate growth and drive long-term profitability”(Coca Cola 
Press Release, 2010).  
Our data come from the largest anchor bottler for one of the two dominant CPs. The Bottler 
owns dozens of bottling plants and hundreds of distribution centers (DCs), accounting for more 
than half of the beverages its CP sold in North America. Like most of its competitors, the Bottler 
employs a make-to-stock (as opposed to make-to-order) inventory system. Products are produced 
and stocked at a stable pace according to a forecast of future sales, i.e., before customers place 
actual orders. Orders are placed based on the CP parent’s product lists, national advertisements, 
and promotion deals without knowledge of the DCs’ actual inventory.  
                                                          
2
 Because of the big difference between the CP’s and the bottler’s business models and profit margins, partial 
ownership does not sufficiently solve the incentive or information problems between the two parties. Vertical 
integration fully aligns the two entities’ incentives, thereby improving coordination. Empirically, studying a 
transition from partial ownership (as opposed to from an arms-length relationship) to integration implies that our 
estimation of the integration impact is more conservative.  
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The Bottler delivers its products on trucks to retailer stores both large (e.g., supermarkets) 
and small (e.g., convenience stores). Stockouts occur when a DC cannot deliver an entire order 
to a given retail outlet. Unfilled demand is not backordered. New orders are placed based on the 
retail store’s current inventory levels. Demand is forecasted for eight, four, and two weeks in the 
future and updated every week on a rolling-horizon basis. Production plans are based on the 
four-week-advance forecasts and the current inventory level. The Bottler tries to retain four 
weeks of forecasted demand in inventory at the beginning of every four-week period, though 
actual inventory varies both across product categories and over time. 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
The exogenous shock in the demand for Non-CSDs became especially salient toward the end of 
the last decade. The upstream CPs responded with an increased rate of product introductions in 
the non-CSD category. The newness of these products implies more information asymmetry: the 
upstream firm will have greater uncertainty about consumers’ willingness to pay, while the 
downstream firm will find it more difficult to predict the upstream firm’s product promotion and 
launch plans. This is therefore a valuable period of time to carry out our empirical investigation. 
Data and Sample 
We obtained operations data for all U.S. DCs from the beginning of 2008 to the second month of 
2011. Together these 264 DCs delivered thousands of SKUs over the sample period, including 
SKUs owned by the CP parent and SKUs delivered for other companies under license 
agreements. An SKU is defined as a unique combination of brand, flavor, weight, container 
material, container size, and package size. It is a commonly used measure of product variety 
(Fosfuri & Giarratana, 2009). Our data is weekly except for inventory, which is only available at 
the period level. Each period contains four weeks. In order to accommodate the frequency of the 
inventory data and to save computation time, we aggregated the data to the period level.  
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We first examined some summary statistics at the DC level. We found that on average about 
37% of the SKUs and 20% of the sales carried by a DC were for NonCSDs. In addition, there 
was a significant increase in both the number of SKUs and total sales at the DC level after 
integration, especially for NonCSDs. The number of NonCSD SKUs increased by 27%, 
NonCSD sales per DC increased by 15%, and the share of NonCSD sales increased by 2%.  
To compare operations variables before and after integration, we limited our sample to those 
SKUs that the 264 DCs carried at the time of integration, including about 1,200 SKUs owned by 
the CP parent and 300 SKUs delivered to other upstream CPs under license agreements. Our 
final sample contains about two million DC–SKU–period observations. 
Variables 
We first examined Stockoutsit, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if SKU s experiences at 
least one stockout at DC i in period t, and is 0 otherwise. We then examined a few other 
operations variables in order to explain any change we observed in stockouts. Among them, 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡, is inventory (in days of sales) of SKU s carried by DC i in period t. 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the ratio between actual and forecasted sales of SKU s carried by DC 
i in period t. It is also called AF ratio, a standard measure of forecast accuracy in operations 
management. It reflects the bias in sales forecasts. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the standard 
deviation in weekly AF ratios for SKU s carried by DC i in period t. It reflects the noise in sales 
forecasts.  
Our main independent variables include Integrationt, a dummy variable that indicates the 
time periods after the integration, NonCSDs, a dummy variable that indicates whether the SKU is 
a NonCSD product, and the interaction term between Integrationt and NonCSDs. We also 
included several control variables, all at the DC–SKU-period level, that might affect each 
dependent variable. Among them, Salessit is the quantity (in standardized cases) of SKU s sold by 
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DC i in period t, log transformed. Sales Volatilitysit is measured using the coefficient of variation 
(CV) in sales, or the standard deviation of sales normalized by its mean.  
Table 1 provides sample descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the combined sample 
of own- and rival products. The unit of analysis is DC–SKU–period. An average SKU had a 25% 
chance of stockouts at a DC in every period. About 40% of the observations were for NonCSDs. 
An average SKU was sold in 154 (exp(5.04)) cases per period per DC. The volatility in weekly 
sales for an average DC–SKU–period was 0.17. The average inventory was about 31 days of 
actual sales. The average AF ratio was 1.01. That is, on average, sales forecasted by DCs were 
about 99% of actual sales. The standard deviation in forecasting was 0.14.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 compares mean values before and after integration, for own-CSDs, own-NonCSDs, 
and rival brands, respectively.
3
 A few key differences can be observed from the table. First, 
before integration DCs sold far more own-CSDs (exp(5.58)=265 cases per DC-SKU-period) and 
rival CSDs (exp(5.39)=219 cases) than own-NonCSDs ((exp(4.47)=89 cases). Secondly, there 
was no significant change in stockout rates for own-CSDs after integration. In comparison, there 
was a significant reduction in stockout rates for own-NonCSDs (p-value=0.040) and an increase 
in stockout rates for rival products (p-value=0.080). Thirdly, there was a reduction in sales per 
SKU and an increase in sales volatility across the board, most likely due to increased product 
variety. Fourthly, DCs kept more inventory for NonCSDs than for both own- and rival CSDs, 
reflecting the extra buffer needed to satisfy uncertain and more volatile NonCSD sales. After 
                                                          
3
 The majority (95%) of rival products were CSDs; we therefore did not separately examine rival-NonCSD products. 
Even though the Bottler carried mostly CSD products for the upstream rivals, the upstream rivals could still learn 
from the Bottler Coca-Cola and Pepsi’s plans for NonCSDs and use this information to develop their own NonCSD 
products bottled by themselves or other plants. 
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integration, inventory increased for own-CSDs and rival products but decreased for own-
NonCSDs (p-values<0.0001). Finally, DCs’ sales forecast became less noisy for own-products 
but more noisy for rival products (p-values<0.0001). Of course, these mean comparisons do not 
control for any factor that might influence these variables, such as time trend, seasonal 
fluctuation, or unobservable heterogeneity at the DC–SKU level. We will consider these factors 
in our econometric analyses. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Specifications 
We designed most of our specifications based on standard textbooks of operations management 
(e.g., Anupindi et al., 2011; Cachon & Terwiesch, 2012). We included DC–SKU and seasonal 
fixed effects and an annual trend in all main specifications. For linear regression models, we also 
clustered robust standard errors at the DC level to account for correlation among SKUs carried 
by the same DC. 
Our main regression estimated stockout rate for products owned by the CP parent at the DC–
SKU–period level: 
𝐸[𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡] = 𝐷𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑖 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛼0𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 
+ 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑆𝐷𝑠 + 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑡𝛾      (1), 
 
where 𝐷𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑖 and 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑡 are DC-SKU pair and season fixed effects, respectively. 
According to these textbooks, assuming sales follow a normal distribution, the probability of 
stockouts (stockout rate) can be illustrated as the probability of the actual demand being greater 
than the available inventory; such probability depends on sales quantity and volatility. We 
therefore include them as control variables in 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑡. 
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We then compared a few operations variables that might have contributed to the change in 
stockouts. To do that, we estimated the following fixed-effects specifications:  
𝐷𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝐶𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠𝑖 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛼0𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 
+ 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑆𝐷𝑠 + 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑠𝑖𝑡      (2), 
 
where 𝐷𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑡 represents different operations variables such as inventory, and sales forecast (both 
level and noise), as defined before.  
Finally, we replicated Equations (1) and (2) on the subsample of rival products to identify 
any difference between the own- and rival products in changes after integration.  
RESULTS 
Pre-integration Coordination (Own Products) 
Table 3 compares stockouts and the other main operations variables for CSDs and NonCSDs 
owned by the CP parent before integration. The coefficients in Columns (1)–(4) are consistent 
with our expectation. NonCSDs had a higher rate of stockouts. A marginal effect calculation 
(keeping all other variables at their mean values) shows that NonCSDs were 6% more likely to 
experience a stockout than CSDs. This was despite the fact that NonCSDs had five more days of 
buffer inventory. DCs also tended to under-forecast sales more for NonCSDs, and the standard 
deviation in sales forecast for NonCSDs tended to be higher than that for CSDs. The p-values 
were less than 0.001 for all these coefficients. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Column (5) investigates any time trend in stockouts before integration. For each DC–SKU 
pair we compared the stockouts two years before the integration and the stockouts for the last 
period before integration. The dependent variable, pre-integration increase in stockouts, assumed 
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the value of 1 if the DC–SKU pair did not experience a stockout two years before integration but 
experienced a stockout during the last period before integration. A marginal effect calculation 
based on the coefficient (keeping all other variables at their mean values) shows that NonCSDs 
were 3% (p-value<0.001) more likely to experience an increasing likelihood of stockouts before 
integration.  
Post-integration Coordination (Own Products) 
Table 4 estimates the probability of stockouts for the CP’s own products. All models included an 
annual trend, seasonal dummies, and DC–SKU fixed effects. A marginal effect calculation based 
on Column (1) suggests that stockout rate fell by 2% (p-value<0.001) after integration, from a 
pre-integration stockout rate of 26%. The change is sizable given that it happened during the 
short period of one year after integration. Interviews with the Bottler’s management confirmed 
that there had not been any significant adjustments in the Bottler’s operations, such as 
investments in physical assets and equipment or a reallocation of sourcing relationships, that 
would have dramatically improved production capacity and reduced stockouts. 
Columns (2) and (3) show a negative coefficient to the interaction between integration and 
NonCSD dummies (p-values are 0.035 and 0.079, respectively). However, the significance of 
the interaction term in logit models may not be read directly from the coefficients (Hoetker, 2007; 
Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004; Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). To properly interpret the interaction 
term, we first examined the odds ratios (Buis, 2010). Our calculation based on Column (3) 
suggests that the odds of a stockout was 5% lower after integration, and the odds of a stockout 
after integration for NonCSDs was 0.98% of the odds for CSDs. In addition, we estimated 
stockouts separately for CSDs and NonCSDs in Columns (4) and (5). Results show a highly 
significant reduction in stockouts for NonCSDs after integration (p-value<0.001) and a less 
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significant reduction in stockouts for CSDs (p-value=0.050). A Wald’s test confirms that the 
difference in the integration coefficients across the two groups is statistically significant (p-
value<0.001).4 These additional tests support our expectation that stockouts decreased more for 
NonCSDs than for CSDs after integration. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Alternative Explanations. Integration can bring about multiple benefits other than improving 
coordination between the CP and the Bottler (Financial Times, 2009b; The Wall Street Journal, 
2010). Some of these benefits are alternative explanations for the integration decision, although 
they will not necessarily reduce stockouts. For example, integration helps introduce more 
innovative products, but this will not reduce stockouts for products in our sample, which includes 
only products that the Bottler was already carrying at the time of the integration. If anything, 
increasing product variety increases rather than reduces stockouts (Anderson, Fitzsimons, & 
Simester, 2006b; Musalem et al., 2010; Wan et al., 2012).  Integration benefits that are unrelated 
to stockouts would make our estimation less endogenous and more conservative. In addition to 
product innovation, integration might also create opportunities for process innovation that could 
potentially reduce stockouts. Because a large number of own- and rival products share the same 
facilities and processes (which drives scale economy for the Bottler in the first place), we 
estimated separately the change in stockouts for own- and rival products after integration. 
Column (1) in Table 7 suggests that stockouts for rival products increased rather than decreased 
after integration, refuting the process-innovation story. Our interviews with company staff also 
                                                          
4
 To account for potential difference in residual variations across the two groups, we also followed Hoetker (2006) 
and calculated the difference in a ratio of two coefficients, e.g. coefficients for integration and log(sales quantity) (or 
sales volatility). These calculations confirmed that the negative effect of integration (relative to the effect of sales 
quantity or volatility) was both economically and statistically more significant for NonCSDs than for CSDs.  
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confirmed that no significant process changes had been made during the short duration of our 
sample period. 
An alternative explanation for the reduction in stockouts is unobserved factors (omitted 
variables). For example, it could be that the CP decided to integrate (and obtain a larger share of 
the Bottler’s profit) because the change in consumer preferences had made NonCSD products 
more profitable for the DCs. At the same time, if NonCSD products became more profitable for a 
DC, it would have also carried more NonCSDs and thereby reduced stockouts. Factors like this 
could drive a spurious relationship between integration and stockouts. Unfortunately, we do not 
have price or profit information at the product level to control for this. Instead, we took a few 
steps to mitigate this concern. First, if DCs carry more NonCSDs because they become more 
profitable, these products should experience an increase in sales. Therefore we control for sales 
quantity and time trend in all of our regressions. Second, as a robustness check we performed a 
test that corrects for selection at the DC level. We exploited the fact that a number of states had 
imposed and credibly threatened a penalty for soda consumption during our sample period.
5
 
Based on this information, we first estimated the likelihood that a DC had more than 20% of 
sales from NonCSDs during our sample period; these DCs are called diversified DCs. Our results 
show that DCs in states with a soda penalty were more likely to be diversified. In the second 
stage, we estimated the likelihood that a DC reduced stockouts after integration, correcting for 
self-selection using an Inverse Mills Ratio calculated from the first stage. Our results are 
included in the online Appendix. They confirm that after correcting for selection diversified DCs 
                                                          
5
 For example, Washington imposed a $0.02 per ounce tax on CSDs in 2010 (The Seattle Times, 2010) and  New 
York proposed a $0.01 per ounce tax on soft drinks in its 2009 state budget (The New York Times). Virginia 
imposed a state excise tax on soda in addition to a sales tax. A number of other states, such as Maryland, levy sales 
taxes on soda but not on other grocery food (Pinho, 2012). 
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were still more likely to see a reduction in their average stockout rate after integration, which is 
consistent with our main results in Table 4. 
In sum, while multiple expected benefits can explain the CP’s motivation to vertically 
integrate, not all of them can explain the reduction in stockouts that we observe in Table 4. The 
next subsection will examine a few operations variables to shed light on the exact mechanisms 
through which stockouts reduced after integration. 
Inventory and Sales Forecasts. Table 5 explores a few mechanisms that could reduce 
stockouts. The most obvious one is to increase inventory. While before integration the DCs 
might not be willing to hold too much inventory at the cost of working capital, after integration 
they should have more incentive to do so. Table 5 first compares inventory before and after 
integration. Coefficients in Column (1) suggest that, as expected, inventory of own-CSDs 
increased by close to a day of sales after integration (p-value<0.001). However, to our surprise, 
inventory of own-NonCSDs decreased by three days (p-value<0.001). This implies that if 
inventory for NonCSDs had not been reduced after integration, the stockout rate for NonCSDs 
would have fallen even more.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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One potential explanation for the reduction in both stockouts and inventory is that within 
each four-week period the fluctuation in inventory more closely matched that in sales after 
integration; therefore stockouts could fall despite less period-average inventory relative to sales. 
Unfortunately, we do not have daily or weekly inventory data to test this idea at a granular level, 
even though we notice that the standard deviation of inventory in days of sales during the post-
integration period was two days less than before integration.  
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One of the most important ways to better match inventory to sales is through more accurate 
sales forecasting. After all, real-time inventory (in days of sales) is determined based on 
forecasted quantity, adjusted with the lagged actual-to-forecast (AF) ratio and forecast noise 
(standard deviation in AF ratio) (e.g., Anupindi et al., 2011; Cachon & Terwiesch, 2012). More 
accurate sales forecasts will not only better match inventory and sales to reduce stockouts, but 
also give DCs the confidence to hold less “buffer” inventory.  
Column (2) compares sales forecast. It suggests that DCs increased their sales forecasts 
(reduced AF ratio) from about 99% to 100% of actual sales after integration  (p-value=0.004). 
We argued in the theory section that improved sales forecasting could be caused by better 
monitoring and more information sharing by the CP. To test this mechanism, column (3) adds a 
dummy to capture if the DC is in the same or a neighboring state of the CP parent. A number of 
scholars have found that the integration benefit of better monitoring is more prevalent for units 
that are geographically near headquarters than for units that are far away (Brickley & Dark, 1987; 
Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2013; Rubin, 1978). This is because monitoring often requires managers 
from headquarters to visit the units routinely, which can be costly for units in remote locations. 
Consistent with this line of logic, the coefficients in column (3) confirm that the upward 
correction in sales forecasts was mostly experienced by DCs that were located near the CP  (p-
value=0.011). Column (3) also included the age of the product (number of periods since its 
initial launch). Older products have more sales information to reduce forecast bias and should 
benefit less from integration. This coefficient is supportive but not statistically significant.  
Columns (4) and (5) compare the noise in sales forecasts. Results suggest that DCs reduced 
the noise in their sales forecasts after integration (p-value<0.001), and the reduction was greater 
for DCs far away from the CP (p-value=0.001). Consistent with our arguments above, DCs close 
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to the CP would be able to partially observe some “hint” that the CP will initiate a new product 
launch or promotion, whereas a DC far away would have to wait for the CP’s explicit 
notification. DCs faraway therefore experienced a greater information disadvantage before 
integration and would benefit more from integration. Column 5 also confirms that forecasts of 
newer products benefited (experienced a greater reduction in forecast noise) from integration (p-
value<0.001). 
Overall, results in table 5 suggest that the joint reduction in both stockout rates and inventory 
after integration was due to an overall improvement in coordination efficiency, most likely 
reduced information asymmetry in both directions. While reductions in the bottler’s information 
misrepresentation (i.e., increasing sales forecasts) after integration can explain the reduction in 
inventory in days of forecasted sales, it cannot not explain the reduction in inventory in days of 
actual sales. We think the inventory reduction (beyond what can be explained by reduced 
forecast bias) may be due to the DCs reducing buffer inventory as they became more confident in 
a less noisy sales forecasts. In a supplementary analysis, we do find that inventory was positively 
associated with both the downward forecast bias and forecast noise in the previous period. 
In order to see if inventory and sales forecasts explain the reduction in stockouts, in Table 6 
we re-estimated stockouts with the additional variables of inventory and sales forecasts. The 
results first confirm that stockouts were negatively related to inventory and positively correlated 
with AF ratio and noise in sales forecasts. In addition, columns (1) and (2) confirm that after 
controlling for the changes in inventory, stockouts increased for CSDs (p-value=0.069) and 
reduced even more) for NonCSDs (p-value<0.001). Columns (3) and (4) confirm that after 
controlling for the improvement in sales forecasts, the change in stockouts became smaller. 
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Wald’s tests of these coefficients across models suggest that their differences are statistically 
significantly. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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Vertical Integration and Rival Products 
To facilitate a comparison with the CPs’ own products, Table 7 estimates the changes in 
stockouts, inventory, and sales forecasts for the products of rival CPs. The coefficients show that 
the stockout rate and forecast noise increased while inventory and sales forecast reduced after 
integration (p-value<0.001), consistent with our expectation.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
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In sum, the results in Tables 4–6 imply that, despite the increased sales volatility that 
accompanies a greater level of variety in the NonCSD category, DCs were able to reduce both 
stockouts and inventory for own-NonCSDs after integration. This is consistent with DCs having 
more incentive to increase sales forecast levels and having better information to reduce noise in 
their forecasting. In contrast, Table 7 suggests that there was a deterioration in DCs’ operational 
performance for rival products, in terms of both holding adequate inventory and accurately 
forecasting sales. 
In addition to the main results in Tables 3–7, we ran a host of robustness checks. For 
example, to reduce potential simultaneity we lagged all independent variables. To avoid any 
estimation bias due to some dependent variables being left-censored, we re-estimated these 
variables using their logtransformed values and Tobit models, respectively. Our main results 
were robust to these alternative specifications. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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This paper studies how product variety creates coordination problems along the value chain, and 
how vertical integration helps to solve these problems through incentive alignment and 
information sharing. In particular, we examined challenges between a concentrate producer (CP) 
and its anchor bottler in coordinating product introduction, manufacturing, and distribution. We 
show that, in this particular case, vertical integration had a positive impact on coordination (in 
terms of stockouts, inventory, and sales forecast) for the CP’s own products but a negative 
impact on coordination for products the bottler carried for the CP’s rivals. 
The key theoretical contribution of the paper is to marry two primarily unrelated streams of 
prior work on product variety and vertical scope. It relates product scope extension to 
coordination challenges along the value chain and examines the coordination benefits and 
tradeoffs of vertical integration. It complements recent studies on the coordination challenges 
firms face when they pursue economies of scope. It also complements studies on the 
coordination benefits of vertical integration for enhancing firms’ adaptability. Finally, by 
highlighting how an integrated firm improves coordination at the cost of its upstream rivals, the 
paper implies an intricate mechanism of non-price discrimination. 
A second theoretical contribution of the paper is to bridge existing work on product variety in 
operations management and strategy, respectively. On the one hand, even though there is a large 
body of mathematical models about variety-related problems in operations management, these 
models are usually built at the level of a single plant or production line. Studies about variety and 
the interaction between organizational units along the supply chain are rare. This paper fills this 
gap. At the same time, while there is a large body of literature on the benefits of vertical 
integration in strategy, the empirical investigation has been limited to aggregate, firm-level 
performance under different governance modes or to a single performance measure at the 
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transaction level. By incorporating basic models from operations management on stockouts, 
inventory, and sales forecasts, this paper paints a more complete picture of the mechanisms 
behind coordination and vertical integration. 
The paper has a few limitations that create opportunities for future research. Because this is a 
case study of one company, it cannot answer the general question of whether an increase in 
product variety should be accompanied by an increase or a reduction in vertical scope. On the 
one hand, product scope and vertical scopes may be complementary because vertical integration 
allows firms to exercise stronger control over resources and processes that are shared across 
related markets (Forbes & Lederman, 2009; Novak & Stern, 2009). On the other hand, because 
firms are constrained in their total coordination capacity, their product and vertical scopes may 
act as substitutes (Zhou, 2011). Our study presents one scenario where vertical integration 
improves product-level efficiency for the integrated company, to the disadvantage of its rivals. 
This is consistent with both the coordination-benefit and coordination-capacity-constraint 
arguments.  
Firm scope is a dynamic phenomenon that shifts with the relative magnitude of transaction 
and integration costs. Integration is justified when benefits of a coordinated response to 
environmental changes outweigh the potential organization and production costs that can be 
saved through outsourcing, or when firms need to develop integrative capabilities to face future 
challenge of successive system innovations (Helfat & Campo-Rembado, 2016). In the context of 
this study, the CPs integrated their bottlers, in spite of low profit margins in the bottling business, 
in order to achieve a coordinated response at a time when consumer demand for NonCSDs was 
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evolving rapidly.
6
 Historically, CPs have repeatedly integrated and disintegrated their bottlers. 
The recentness of this particular integration event prevents us from investigating whether the 
integration benefits are sustainable given the worsening service for upstream rivals’ products and 
the potential burden of coordinating the integrated firm. On the one hand, integration provides 
incentives for more information sharing. On the other hand, integration removes the boundary 
that used to insulate the upstream and downstream firms from each other and imposes more 
complex relationships between the two. Only three years after acquiring their bottlers, both CPs 
announced that they intended to refranchise their distribution networks (Beverage Daily, 2013; 
Coca-Cola Company Press, 2016). Future studies may examine the CPs’ performance in the now 
more mature NonCSD segment after franchising. 
Studying hundreds of organization units and thousands of product varieties within a single 
company allowed us to eliminate unobserved firm heterogeneity and extract detailed operations 
data about key elements of coordination. However, we did not have a control group that could 
help us to identify the causal effect of integration more sharply. While we cannot fully solve this 
endogeneity issue, we tried to mitigate it by (1) ruling out alternative explanations, (2) adding a 
strict set of control variables and fixed effects, (3) adopting a selection model and other 
robustness checks, (4) comparing post-integration changes in multiple operations variables to 
construct a cohesive story, (5) exploiting pre- and post- integration differences across various 
product categories (CSDs vs. NonCSDs, own- vs. rival, new vs. old) and distribution centers 
(those close to vs. those far away from the CP headquarters, those diversified vs. those never 
                                                          
6
 In addition to potentially lower profit margin in adjacent stages along the value chain, firms that vertically integrate 
might also suffer from a lack of expertise and experience in the acquired stages. In our particular setting, the CP has 
had a close partnership with the Bottler for decades. It also retained most of the production equipment and 
management of the Bottler after integration. Therefore, the integrated firm can still benefit from the Bottler’s 
manufacturing expertise and experience. 
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significantly diversified), and (6) using rival products as a “placebo” or “falsification” test that 
further removes some time-varying DC characteristics. By using this comparative approach, the 
paper aimed to identify the exact mechanisms that could explain the change in stockouts.  
In conclusion, this paper highlighted the intricate and important challenges facing firms that 
pursue product variety. It showed that vertical integration plays a positive role in coordination by 
aligning incentives and facilitating information sharing along the value chain. At the same time, 
integration has the potential to crowd out coordination for rival products. 
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Table 1  Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 Variable Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Stockout (1,0) 0.25 0.44 1.00        
(2) Integration (1,0) 0.37 0.48 -0.001 1.00       
(3) NonCSD (1,0) 0.42 0.49 0.01 -0.002 1.00      
(4) Sales 5.04 1.68 0.15 -0.05 -0.31 1.00     
(5) Sales volatility 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.54 1.00    
(6) Inventory (in days of sales) 31 32 -0.10 -0.01 0.20 -0.45 0.36 1.00   
(7) Sales forecast level  (AF ratio) 1.01 0.34 0.12 0.03 -0.05 0.18 -0.07 -0.31 1.00  
(8) Sales forecast noise 0.14 0.10 -0.03 -0.004 0.06 -0.25 0.35 0.11 -0.03 1.00 
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Table 2  Mean comparison 
 
Own-CSDs Pre-integration Post-integration Difference (p-value) 
Stockout (1,0) 0.26 0.26 0 (0.907) 
Sales 5.58 5.50 -0.08 (0.000) 
Sales volatility 0.15 0.16 0.01 (0.000) 
Inventory (in days of sales) 24.90 25.21 0.31 (0.000) 
Sales forecast level  (AF ratio) 1.01 1.03 0.02 (0.000) 
Sales forecast noise 0.140 0.137 -0.003 (0.000) 
 
Own-NonCSDs Pre-integration Post-integration Difference (p-value) 
Stockout (1,0) 0.26 0.25 -0.01 (0.040) 
Sales 4.49 4.30 -0.19 (0.000) 
Sales volatility 0.18 0.19 0.01 (0.000) 
Inventory (in days of sales) 38.69 36.85 -1.84 (0.000) 
Sales forecast level  (AF ratio) 0.98 1.01 0.03(0.21) 
Sales forecast noise 0.152 0.15 -0.002 (0.000) 
 
Rival products 
(mostly CSDs) 
Pre-integration Post-integration Difference (p-value) 
Stockout (1,0) 0.24 0.25 0.01 (0.080) 
Sales 5.39 5.13 -0.26 (0.090) 
Sales volatility 0.16 0.17 0.01 (0.000) 
Inventory (in days of sales) 25.75 26.77 1.01 (0.000) 
Sales forecast level  (AF ratio) 1.07 1.04 -0.03 (0.340) 
Sales forecast noise 0.14 0.15 0.01 (0.000) 
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Table 3  Coordination challenges for own products before integration 
 
DV = Stockout (1,0)  
(1) 
Inventory (in days of sales)  
(2) 
Forecast Level (AF)  
(3) 
Forecast Noise  
(4) 
Pre-integration increase  
in stockouts (0,1)  
(5) 
NonCSD (1,0) 0.324     (0.000) 5.353     (0.000)  0.011     (0.000)  0.003     (0.000)  0.196     (0.000)  
 [0.005]  [0.333]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.018]  
Sales 0.362     (0.000)  -6.868     (0.000)  0.045     (0.000)  -0.004     (0.000)  0.278     (0.000)  
 [0.002]  [0.236]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.005]  
Sales volatility 2.002     (0.000)  34.506     (0.000)  0.147     (0.000)  0.200     (0.000)  2.659     (0.000)  
 [0.016]  [0.903]  [0.010]  [0.004]  [0.055]  
Season dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,297,634  1,297,634  1,297,634  1,297,634  100,672  
Log-likelihood -711,038  -6.19E+06  -408,500  1.27E+06  -45,197  
Pseudo R
2
 0.036  0.243  0.041  0.135  0.045  
Logit estimation is used for columns (1) and (5), and ordinary least square linear regressions are used for columns (2)–(4). Standard errors for columns (1) and (5) 
and robust standard errors clustered at DC level for columns (2)–(4) are included in square brackets. The dependent variable in column (5) is the probability that 
a DC–SKU did not experience a stockout in the two years before integration but experienced a stockout in the last four-week period before integration. P-values 
are in parentheses. All tests are two tailed. 
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Table 4  Vertical integration and stockout rate for own products 
DV = Stockout (1,0) (1) ALL (2) ALL (3) ALL (4) CSD (5) NonCSD 
Integration -0.049    (0.000) -0.040    (0.000) -0.054    (0.000) -0.019    (0.050) -0.153    (0.000) 
 [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] 
NonCSD_X_Integration  -0.017    (0.035) -0.015    (0.079)   
  [0.008] [0.008]   
Sales   0.490    (0.000) 0.415    (0.000) 0.567    (0.000) 
   [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] 
Sales volatility   2.568    (0.000) 2.702    (0.000) 2.439    (0.000) 
   [0.016] [0.024] [0.023] 
Annual trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DC-SKU pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,016,158 2,016,158 2,016,158 1,048,436 967,772 
Log-likelihood -817,743 -817,741 -801,719 -416,493 -384,569 
Pseudo R
2
 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.025 
Fixed logit estimation is used for all columns. Standard errors are included in square brackets. P-values are in parentheses. All tests are two tailed. 
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Table 5  Alternative mechanisms for stockout reduction: inventory and sales forecasts 
 Inventory (in days of sales) Forecast-Level (AF) Forecast-Noise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Integration   0.808     (0.000) -0.010    (0.004) -0.015    (0.278) -0.007    (0.000) -0.051    (0.000) 
 [0.210] [0.003] [0.014] [0.001] [0.003] 
NonCSD_X_Integration  -3.843     (0.000) 0.001    (0.587)  0.002    (0.446) -0.002    (0.000) 0.0001    (0.855) 
 [0.227] [0.003] [0.003] [0.0004] [0.0005] 
Sales -20.351     (0.000) 0.333    (0.000)  0.333    (0.000)  0.020    (0.000) 0.020    (0.000) 
 [0.243] [0.005] [0.005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
Sales volatility   7.739     (0.000) 0.047    (0.000)  0.048    (0.000)  0.177    (0.000) 0.177    (0.000) 
 [0.738] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.003] 
DC near CP (1,0)_X_Integration    -0.016    (0.011)  0.003    (0.001) 
   [0.006]  [0.001] 
Product age_X_Integration    0.002    (0.489)  0.010    (0.000) 
   [0.003]  [0.0006] 
Annual trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DC-SKU pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,016,158 2,016,158 2,016,158 2,016,158 2,016,158 
Log-likelihood -8.94E+06 -287854 -595,322 2.24E+06 2.17E+06 
Adjusted R
2
 0.593 0.303 0.308 0.308 0.308 
Fixed effects linear regressions are used for all columns. Robust standard errors clustered at DC level are included in square brackets for all columns. P-values 
are in parentheses. All tests are two tailed. 
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Table 6  Impact of inventory and sales forecasts on stockouts 
DV=Stockout (1,0) (1) CSD (2) NonCSD (3) CSD (4) NonCSD 
Integration 0.017     (0.069) -0.175     (0.000) -0.011     (0.245) -0.121     (0.000) 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Sales 0.105     (0.000) 0.156     (0.000) 0.004     (0.523) 0.046     (0.000) 
 [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] 
Sales volatility 2.763     (0.000) 2.491     (0.000) 1.809     (0.000) 1.749     (0.000) 
 [0.024] [0.023] [0.032] [0.033] 
Inventory (in days of sales) -0.019     (0.000) -0.019     (0.000) -0.017     (0.000) -0.017     (0.000) 
 [0.001] [0.006] [0.0002] [0.0001] 
Forecast-Level (AF)   0.669     (0.000) 0.550     (0.000) 
   [0.011] [0.012] 
Forecast-Noise   1.860     (0.000) 1.362     (0.000) 
   [0.042] [0.045] 
Annual trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DC-SKU pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,048,436 967,772 1,048,436 967,772 
Log-likelihood -408,828 -373,511 -393,025 -360,260 
Adjusted R
2
 0.037 0.053 0.054 0.067 
Inventory and sales forecasts are measured at the beginning of each period. Fixed effects linear regressions are used for all columns. Robust standard errors 
clustered at DC level are included in square brackets for all columns. P-values are in parentheses. All tests are two tailed. 
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Table 7  Integration and rival products  
 Stockout (1,0) Inventory (in days of sales) Forecast-Level (AF) Forecast-Noise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Integration 0.055     (0.001) -2.332     (0.000) 0.085     (0.000) 0.004     (0.000) 
 [0.017] [0.293] [0.004] [0.001] 
Sales 0.526     (0.000) -17.177     (0.000) 0.307     (0.000) 0.015     (0.000) 
 [0.010] [0.430] [0.008] [0.001] 
Sales volatility 2.822     (0.000) 9.082     (0.000) 0.078     (0.000) 0.216     (0.000) 
 [0.042] [1.021] [0.015] [0.005] 
Annual trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Season dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DC-SKU pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 315,870 304,983 315,870 315,870 
Log-likelihood -124828 -1.37E+06 -62280 354696 
Pseudo/Adjusted R
2
 0.026 0.576 0.259 0.317 
Fixed effects logit estimation is used for column 1 and fixed effects ordinary least square linear regressions are used for columns (2)–(4). Standard errors for 
column (1) and robust standard errors clustered at DC level in columns (2)–(4) are included in square brackets. P-values are in parentheses. All tests are two 
tailed. 
 
